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THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS: MYTH OR REALITY?
Stephen Choi*
Jill Fisch**
Marcel Kahan∗∗∗
ABSTRACT
Recent regulatory changes increasing shareholder voting authority have
focused attention on the role of proxy advisors. In particular, greater
shareholder empowerment raises the question of how much proxy advisors
influence voting outcomes. This Article analyzes the significance of voting
recommendations issued by four proxy advisory firms in connection with
uncontested director elections. We find, consistent with press reports, that
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is the most powerful proxy advisor and
that, of the others, only Glass, Lewis & Co. seems to have a meaningful impact
on shareholder voting.
This Article also attempts to measure the impact of voting
recommendations on voting outcomes. Unlike prior literature, it distinguishes
correlation from causality by examining both the recommendation itself and
the underlying factors that may influence a shareholder’s vote. Using several
different tests, we conclude that popular accounts substantially overstate the
influence of ISS.
Our findings reveal that the impact of an ISS
recommendation is reduced greatly once company- and firm-specific factors
important to investors are taken into consideration. Overall, we estimate that
an ISS recommendation shifts 6%–10% of shareholder votes. We also
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determine that a major component of ISS’s influence stems from its role as an
information agent, aggregating factors that its subscribers consider important.
INTRODUCTION
Proxy advisors—private firms that analyze corporate elections and advise
investor clients on how to vote their shares—are recent and potentially
powerful new players in the corporate governance world.1 Institutional
investors, which hold an increasing percentage of the shares of U.S.
companies,2 wield substantial voting power but often lack the appropriate
incentives to cast informed ballots with respect to their portfolio companies.3
Instead, many institutional investors employ the services of proxy advisors to
assist them in exercising their voting rights.4 The services of proxy advisors
include providing research, helping investors develop voting guidelines,
handling the mechanics of the voting process, and offering recommendations

1 See Albert Verdam, An Exploration of the Role of Proxy Advisors in Proxy Voting (Feb. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=978835) (describing
the emergence of proxy advisors); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 6–12
(2007) [hereinafter GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.
pdf (exploring competition and potential conflicts of interest in the proxy advisor market); Colin Diamond &
Irina Yevmenenko, Who Is Overseeing the Proxy Advisors?, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 606, 608 (2008)
(highlighting the proxy advisor market).
2 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010); see also Paul Rose, The
Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897 (2007) (“In 1965, institutional investors held 16% of
U.S. equities; by 2001, institutional investors held 61%.”).
3 According to conventional wisdom, these institutional investors generally do not care enough about
their votes to cast an informed ballot. They hold shares in too many companies, so any particular stake
represents a small fraction of their portfolio, and how they vote is unlikely to affect the outcome and even if it
did, the effect on the value of their portfolio would be minimal. Researching the issues on a company’s annual
meeting agenda is costly, and institutions may also lack the necessary expertise to evaluate these issues
adequately. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 2, at 897 (“Unless an institutional investor believes that it can conduct
research for less, or that more expensive but discerning research will enable it to obtain better returns (after
subtracting its own research costs), the investor may be better off outsourcing its corporate governance
research.”); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation
Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 354 (2009) (“Institutional investors, despite having greater capacity to monitor
and gather information, may have too small a stake in a company or too limited industry expertise to monitor it
actively.”).
4 See, e.g., GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 13 (describing ISS’s client base as
consisting of an estimated 1,700 institutional investors).
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on each issue on a company’s agenda.5 In some cases, institutional investors
may even subcontract their voting decisions to proxy advisors.6
As a result of their capacity to influence voting, proxy advisors are
regarded as very powerful.7 The popular, business, and academic media
describe ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services, a division of RiskMetrics),
the proxy advisor with the largest client base,8 and Glass, Lewis & Co., which
has the second largest client base,9 as “influential,”10 “powerful,”11 and having
great “clout.”12 Commentators have claimed that ISS alone is able to influence
shareholder votes by 19%,13 13.6 to 20.6%,14 30%,15 and even “a third or
more.”16 The collective power of proxy advisors arguably is even greater. As
a result of this influence, management and shareholder activists alike
frequently lobby ISS to endorse their respective positions. As related by
Delaware’s Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine:
[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland,
where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of
5 See, e.g., Glass, Lewis & Co., Proxy Paper: Proxy Research and Voting Recommendations on Global
Proxies, http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/proxypaper.php (last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (describing Glass
Lewis’s proxy research, voting recommendations, and voting platform for voting subscribers’ shares);
RiskMetrics Group, Custom Proxy Advisory, http://www.riskmetrics.com/custom_proxy_advisory (last visited
Aug. 11, 2009) (describing how ISS works with clients to develop customized voting guidelines).
6 RiskMetrics Group, Proxy Advisory Services, http://www.riskmetrics.com/proxy_advisory/options
(last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (detailing the choice of ISS guidelines that subscribers can use and incorporate into
“RiskMetrics’ turnkey voting agency services”).
7 See generally GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1.
8 See id. at 4.
9 Stephen Davis, White Knight Swoops in for Glass Lewis, DIRECTORSHIP, Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008, at 7
(“Glass Lewis is the world’s second biggest proxy adviser next to RiskMetrics . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., Pallavi Gogoi, Support for Bank of America CEO Wanes; Shareholders Meet Today, and
Many Want Him Out, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2009, at B1 (describing RiskMetrics as “[i]nfluential”); Robert D.
Hershey Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, § 3, at 6 (quoting
David W. Smith, president of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals, stating that
“‘[t]he influence [proxy] advisers wield is extraordinary’”).
11 See, e.g., Matt O’Sullivan, When Only a Corporate Jet Will Do, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 28,
2009, at 25 (describing RiskMetrics as “America’s most powerful shareholder voting adviser”).
12 See, e.g., Kim Clark, Reading Proxies for Fun and Profit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 2006,
at EE10 (describing Glass Lewis’s “growing clout”); Joann S. Lublin, RiskMetrics’s Head Faces His Day of
Shareholder Judgment, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, at C1 (“ISS Governance Services . . . exerts tremendous
clout in advising institutional investors on proxy fights . . . .”).
13 Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2404 (2009).
14 Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on
Shareholder Voting, FIN. MGMT, Winter 2002, at 29, 30.
15 Posting of William J. Holstein to BNET: The Corner Office, http://blogs.bnet.com/ceo/?p=1100&tag=
content;col1 (Feb. 7, 2008, 08:03).
16 See Rose, supra note 2, at 889 (attributing this view to executives).
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their views about issues like proposed mergers, executive
compensation, and poison pills. They do so because the CEOs
recognize that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s
advice rather than do any thinking of their own. ISS has been so
17
successful that it now has a California rival, Glass Lewis.

Similarly, commentators have observed that “boards may do what they believe
ISS wants them to in order to keep their seats, whether or not their belief is
justified.”18
This influence is troubling in light of the limited accountability of proxy
advisors. Proxy advisors do not have a financial stake in the companies about
which they provide voting advice; they owe no fiduciary duties to the
shareholders of these companies;19 and they are not subject to any meaningful
regulation.20 Moreover, it is not clear that the proxy advisory industry is
sufficiently competitive and transparent to subject advisory firms—ISS in
particular—to substantial market discipline.21 Institutional investors, for the
reasons outlined above, may lack sufficient interest in voting to scrutinize
advisors’ recommendations carefully. In addition, ISS has, until recently,
enjoyed a near-monopoly position and still remains the dominant firm
providing voting advice.22
The ability of proxy advisors to influence investor voting becomes
particularly significant as the importance of shareholder voting increases.
With respect to director elections, most U.S. companies have shifted in recent
years from plurality to majority voting.23 Under plurality voting, the nominees

17 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges
We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005).
18 Diamond & Yevmenenko, supra note 1, at 617.
19 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006) (“Unlike corporate
managers, neither institutional investors as stockholders nor ISS as a voting advisor owe fiduciary duties to the
corporations whose policies they seek to influence.”).
20 See GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 8–9 (observing that, as pension consultants,
ISS and Proxy Governance, Inc. (PGI) are registered with the SEC as investment advisors while Glass Lewis
and Egan-Jones are not registered as investment advisors).
21 See id. at 14 (acknowledging that “newer proxy advisory firms may face challenges attracting clients
and establishing themselves in the industry”).
22 Id. at 7; Rose, supra note 2, at 899 (“ISS is the dominant firm in the corporate governance
industry . . . .”).
23 In 2005, more than 90% of S&P 500 companies employed plurality voting. See, e.g., Brooke A.
Masters, Shareholders Flex Muscles; Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability Gain Support,
WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at D1 (stating that, as of the start of 2005, fewer than thirty S&P 500 companies
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who win the most votes are elected, regardless of the number of votes that are
“withheld.”24 Thus, in an uncontested election, a single vote in favor is enough
to assure a nominee’s election. By contrast, a majority standard requires a
nominee to receive a majority of the votes cast.25 Under this standard,
shareholders can prevent the election of a nominee even without nominating a
competing candidate; the voters simply must cast a sufficient number of
“withhold” votes. As a consequence, the shift to a majority standard
substantially increases the importance of shareholder voting in uncontested
elections.
Over the same time period, a large number of companies dismantled their
staggered boards.26 The percentage of S&P 500 companies with staggered
boards declined from 55% in 2005 to 40% in 2007.27 In companies with
staggered boards, typically only one-third of the board is up for election in any
given year.28 With a non-staggered board, the whole board is up for election.
Dismantling the staggered board increases the number of directors up for
election each year, thereby increasing the opportunity for shareholders to
exercise their franchise. Indeed, the move from the typical three-year
staggered board to non-staggered, annual elections triples the potential impact
of the shareholder vote.
Finally, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has adopted a rule that
eliminates discretionary broker voting in uncontested director elections.29
had majority voting or director resignation policies in place). By 2008, over 80% had moved away from
plurality voting. Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 23.
24 Under plurality voting, a shareholder in an uncontested election may cast a vote in favor of a director
candidate or withhold voting authority but may not cast a vote “against” the nominees. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch,
The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46, 68 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008)
(explaining the concept of “withheld” votes).
25 See id. at 69 (explaining majority voting).
26 Commentators have described effective staggered boards as the most powerful anti-takeover device
and thus the most effective mechanism by which boards can insulate themselves from shareholder voice. See,
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889–91 (2002).
27 Stephen Taub, Revival of Classified Boards? Well, Maybe Not, COMPLIANCE WK., Sept. 11, 2007,
http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3647/revival-of-classified-boards-well-maybe-not.
28 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2009); see also Gregory T. Carrott, The Case for and
Against Staggered Boards, DIRECTORSHIP, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.directorship.com/against-staggeredboards/ (explaining that, most often, staggered boards provide directors with three year terms).
29 In October 2006, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) proposed to amend Rule 452 governing
broker votes to redefine all director elections as “non-routine,” which would eliminate the ability of brokers to
cast discretionary votes. PROXY WORKING GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY
WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 3 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
PWG_REPORT.pdf. On July 1, 2009, the SEC finally approved the amendments, effectively ending broker
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Historically, brokers who did not receive voting instructions from the
beneficial owners of shares in their brokerage accounts were permitted to vote
these shares in their discretion.30 Brokers generally exercised their discretion
to vote the shares in favor of the slate nominated by the company—the socalled management slate.31 These discretionary broker votes are estimated to
amount to about 19% of the votes cast at annual meetings.32 Under the revised
NYSE rules, companies will lose a sizeable block of automatic votes in favor
of their nominees, shifting power to those shareholders who do vote.33 The
effect of broker voting is illustrated dramatically by the Citigroup 2009 annual
meeting in which broker votes comprised 46% of votes cast.34 Had the NYSE
rule been in effect, two of the Citigroup nominees would not have won reelection.
As the Citigroup annual meeting demonstrates, the number of directors
who receive a large percentage of withhold votes has increased. According to
Georgeson, Inc., one of the leading proxy solicitation firms,35 a record 612
directors at S&P 1500 companies received withhold votes in excess of 15% in
the 2008 proxy season.36 Thirty directors failed to receive a majority of the
votes cast (up from fifteen in 2007).37 Additionally, the number of contested
elections, though still relatively small, continues to increase. For 2008,
discretionary voting in director elections. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by
Amendment No. 4, to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to
Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, Except for Companies Registered Under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, and to Codify Two Previously Published Interpretations that Do Not
Permit Broker Discretionary Voting for Material Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts with an
Investment Company, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293 (July 1, 2009).
30 NYSE, Inc., Rule 452 (Mar. 6, 2003).
31 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2.
32 See Posting of Ted Allen to RiskMetrics Group, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/05/sec-hearstestimony-on-broker-votessubmitted-by-ted-allen-director-of-publications.html (May 25, 2007, 10:58)
(attributing this figure to Broadridge Financial).
33 See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, A Seismic Shift in Mechanics of Electing Directors, N.Y.
L.J., July 27, 2006, at 5 (“If, in the aftermath of NYSE rule changes as proposed, issuers indeed are unable to
contact or obtain voting instructions from large numbers of individual shareholders, the effect will be a
massive shift of voting power from brokers to institutions, and, therefore, to proxy advisory services such as
ISS, Glass, Lewis & Co., and Proxy Governance.”).
34 Citigroup, Inc., First Quarter of 2009 (Form 10-Q), at 156–57 (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/q0901c.pdf?ieNocache=643. (indicating broker votes of 1.732 billion
shares).
35 For information on Georgeson, see http://www.georgeson.com/.
36 GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 7 (2008), available at http://www.
georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2008.pdf.
37 Id. at 7–8. In 2004, twelve directors failed to receive a majority of votes cast. Fisch, supra note 24, at
68.

CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSF

2010]

7/8/2010 2:55 PM

THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS

875

Georgeson reported an all-time high of fifty-six contested solicitations,
following a previous all-time high of forty-six contested solicitations in 2007.38
In comparison, between 1995 and 1999, the number of contested solicitations
averaged twenty-five per year.39
In addition to voting in director elections, shareholders vote on shareholder
proposals introduced pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act.40
As institutional activism increases, the character of these shareholder proposals
has shifted from social policy issues41 to proposals dealing with core economic
and governance questions,42 such as executive compensation,43 shareholder
nomination rights,44 and other corporate governance matters.45 These
proposals are receiving increasing attention and support from shareholders.
The number of proposals receiving majority shareholder support at S&P 1500
companies has increased from twenty-five in 2001 to eighty-six in 2008.46
More importantly, boards have become more responsive to proposals receiving
majority support. The number of implemented proposals rose from three in
2001 to forty-three in 2008.47 As a result of these increases, shareholder power
to introduce proposals is beginning to have a noticeable effect on the
governance of U.S. corporations.

38

GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 8.
Id. at 46.
40 Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Solicitations of Proxies, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2008).
41 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1129, 1152–55 (1993) (describing the rise in shareholder use of social policy proposals in the 1950s and
1960s).
42 See, e.g., A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U.
CIN. L. REV. 357, 371 (1990) (describing the shift from proposals “having a social dimension” to those dealing
with corporate governance).
43 See, e.g., BNA, Annual Meeting Voting Compels More Accountability, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE REP.
30 (2008) (listing “say on pay” executive compensation proposals as one of the top three issues on corporate
ballots for 2008).
44 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d
Cir. 2006) (addressing a shareholder proposal on proxy access).
45 See GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 14 fig.3 (detailing corporate governance proposals from 2004 to
2008).
46 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 27 tbl.4 (citing GEORGESON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANNUAL
MEETING SEASON WRAP UP (2001), available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2001.pdf;
GEORGESON, supra note 36). Prior to 2001, Georgeson prepared a similar report, but it analyzed only
corporate governance proposals made by institutional investors. GEORGESON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP UP (2000), available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/
acgr2000.pdf.
47 Kahan & Rock, supra note 2.
39
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Two regulatory initiatives have the potential to increase the significance of
shareholder votes even more. Under the first initiative—so-called “proxy
access”—shareholders are likely to gain some ability to introduce candidates
for the board of directors in a company’s proxy statement. Although
shareholders have traditionally been able to mount an election contest by
nominating competing candidates, a company is not required to include the
challenger’s nominees on the company proxy statement, and the challenge
requires an independent (and costly) proxy solicitation. For many years
shareholders have sought the power to compel the inclusion of their nominees
on the company’s proxy statement.48 After several unsuccessful attempts to
persuade the SEC to adopt a rule providing for proxy access, institutional
investors began to seek proxy access by introducing amendments to individual
companies’ bylaws.49 Although these efforts were upheld in court,50 in 2007,
the Republican-controlled SEC amended the proxy rules to prohibit
shareholders from using SEC Rule 14a-8 to introduce such bylaw
amendments.51
In 2009, proxy access received a dramatic boost when the Delaware
legislature amended its corporation law to authorize proxy access bylaws
explicitly.52 Subsequently, the new Democratically-controlled SEC introduced
a revised proxy access proposal which, if adopted, would require proxy access
under specified conditions.53 If the SEC adopts a proxy access rule, it would
mean that for companies with majority voting, shareholders would not only
have the power to reject a company’s nominees to the board, but also the
power to select nominees of their own choosing.
The second regulatory initiative—“say-on-pay”—enables shareholders to
vote on executive compensation. Say-on-pay, which is modeled on a
48

Fisch, supra note 37, at 63–67 (reviewing the history of proxy access proposals); Kahan & Rock,
supra note 2 (reviewing the history of proxy access proposals). The SEC first considered a proposed rule
permitting proxy access in 1942. Fisch, supra note 37, at 63. In 2003, the SEC solicited comments on a
complex proposal for proxy access; the proposal stalled due to opposition from corporations and lack of
support from Republican commissioners. Id. at 65–66.
49 Fisch, supra note 24, at 65–66.
50 Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that shareholders can introduce proxy access proposals under Rule 14a-8).
51 Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Solicitations of Proxies, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2008).
52 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009). The legislature also adopted a provision authorizing bylaws that
provide for reimbursement of a shareholder’s proxy solicitation expenses. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113(a)
(2009).
53 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 232, 240, 249, 274 (2009).
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procedure adopted in England in 2002, provides for an annual advisory
shareholder vote on the compensation packages paid to top corporate
executives.54 Institutional investors have introduced shareholder proposals
seeking say-on-pay at a substantial number of companies.55 Some of these
proposals have received majority support,56 and several companies have
already implemented say-on-pay.57 Furthermore, Congress may implement
some form of say-on-pay requirement, either directly through legislation or
indirectly via an SEC rule.58 The House approved a say-on-pay bill in 2007,59
and President Obama has indicated his support for such legislation.60
Similarly, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200861 required
companies receiving financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief
Program to permit a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation.62
Viewed in the context of the increasing importance of the shareholder
franchise, claims about proxy advisor power paint a frightening picture. A few
entities with limited accountability and broad discretion control a huge portion
of the shareholder vote. And the shareholder vote they control influences an
ever-increasing range of issues.
54

Fisch, supra note 37, at 71 (describing say-on-pay).
See, e.g., Robert Kropp, Shareowner Resolutions on Say on Pay Gain Widespread Support, May 6,
2009, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi?sfArticleId=2690 (reporting that seventy-nine say-on-pay
resolutions were introduced in 2008, and more than one hundred have been filed in 2009).
56 According to a preliminary count, as of May 2009, ten of the twenty-nine proposals that came up for a
vote received majority support. Press Release, AFSCME, Say on Pay Shareholder Proposals Garner Record
Support During Tumultuous Shareholder Season (May 4, 2009).
57 See, e.g., Editorial, Stockholders Should Demand a Say on Executive Pay, SEATTLE TIMES, May 14,
2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2009221158_editb15sayonpay.html
(noting that resolutions had been approved by fifteen companies this year and that Hewlett-Packard and
Occidental Petroleum had agreed to adopt say-on-pay without a shareholder vote); SmartPros.com, Say-OnPay Is on the Way, http://accounting.smartpros.com/x65641/xml (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) (listing Occidental
Petroleum, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, MBIA, Motorola, and Ingersoll-Rand as companies that have adopted sayon-pay).
58 See Lawrence Bard et al, Morrison Foerster, Administration Proposals on Compensation Committees
and Say on Pay Would Affect All Public Companies, July 30, 2009, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/
15793.html (describing the Treasury Department’s draft legislation that would require the SEC to adopt rules
mandating say-on-pay for all publicly traded companies).
59 Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. §2 (2007); Shareholder
Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong. §2 (2007).
60 Stephen Taub, Obama Pushes Say on Pay Legislation, CFO.COM, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/11037327/c_11036422 (reporting then-Senator Obama’s support for say-on-pay).
61 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765, 110th Cong.
(2008).
62 Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, Exchange Act Release No.
34-61335, 75 Fed. Reg. 2789 (Jan. 12, 2010) (describing requirement of Section 111(e) of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and amending federal proxy rules to implement the requirement).
55
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Yet, despite the assertions that proxy advisors are powerful, little
systematic study of their actual influence on shareholder votes has been
conducted. Only a handful of academic papers analyze ISS recommendations
empirically. In one article, Jennifer Bethel and Stuart Gillian63 examine votes
on shareholder proposals during the 1998 proxy season. Bethel and Gillan
conclude that a negative ISS recommendation was associated with 13.6% to
20.6% fewer shares voted in favor of management proposals.64 Another recent
paper analyzes the role of ISS recommendations in proxy contests.65 The
authors find that ISS recommendations have significant explanatory value for
contest outcomes.66 Finally, Jie Cai, Jacqueline Garner, and Ralph Walking
examine the factors that determine the percentage of “for” votes cast in
uncontested director elections.67 After controlling for several other factors,
they find that a negative ISS recommendation reduces the vote in favor of
directors by 19%.68
These studies, as well as the other less systematic claims about the effect of
proxy advisors, suffer in varying degrees from two problems. First, they focus
only on ISS and do not consider the effect of other proxy advisors on
shareholder voting. Second, and more importantly, they fail to deal with the
issue of what is meant by the “power” or “influence” of proxy advisors. In
particular, the studies do not distinguish between correlation and causation.
Thus, although they demonstrate that proxy advisor recommendations are
correlated with voting outcomes, they do not fully address the underlying
factors—firm performance, director attendance, and the like—that are likely to
influence both the recommendations and the ultimate vote.69
In this Article, we try to correct for these problems in two ways. First, we
examine the relationship between shareholder votes and the recommendations
of proxy advisors, including not merely ISS, but also Glass Lewis, Proxy
Governance, and Egan Jones. (Glass Lewis is reputedly the second most
influential proxy advisor; Proxy Governance and Egan Jones also provide
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Bethel & Gillan, supra note 14, at 29.
Id. at 46.
65 Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15143, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/paper/w15143.
66 Id. at 34–35.
67 See Cai et al., supra note 13.
68 Id. at 19.
69 The article by Cai and others partially examines other factors that may influence the vote. See Cai, et
al., supra note 13.
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proxy advice.)70 Second, we try to disentangle the difference between
correlation and causation both conceptually and empirically.71
Part I discusses the distinction between correlation and causation and posits
four possible relationships between proxy advisor recommendations and the
subsequent shareholder vote. Part II describes our dataset and provides
summary statistics on advisor recommendations and voting outcomes. Part III
incorporates factors that, we hypothesize, are likely to influence voting
outcomes and, using multivariate regression analysis, analyzes the role these
factors and advisor recommendations play in influencing voting outcomes.
Part IV focuses on ISS in particular and introduces an alternative methodology
for measuring ISS’s power by distinguishing institutional voting behavior from
that of individual retail investors.
I. CORRELATION AND CAUSATION: FOUR TYPES OF “POWER”
Proxy advisor recommendations may correlate with the shareholder vote
for four conceptually distinct reasons. First, the same director nominee and
company characteristics may independently influence both the proxy advisors’
recommendation and the shareholder vote. Second, proxy advisors may gather
information that investors use to make their voting decisions. Third, investors
may select a proxy advisor based on their ex ante agreement with the bases
upon which the advisor formulates its recommendations. Finally, investors
may view the advisor’s recommendation alone as a basis for deciding how to
vote, independent of the underlying factors upon which that recommendation is
based. It is only this last reason that can truly be characterized as causality.
There is reason to believe a substantial overlap exists between the factors
that proxy advisors consider important and those that matter to voters. To
start, there is extensive corporate governance literature examining board
composition and effectiveness.72 Although precise specifications of the
70 See GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 7 (describing ISS, Glass Lewis, Proxy
Governance, and Egan Jones as among the “five major firms” comprising the proxy advisory industry). The
fifth firm included in the GAO report is Marco Consulting Group (MCG), which provides investment
consulting services to Taft-Hartley funds and a number of public benefit plans but does not publicly issue
voting recommendations. See Marco Consulting, Company History, http://www.marcoconsulting.com/1.2.
html (last visited May 5, 2010) (“MCG only provides investment consulting and proxy voting services.”).
71 We explore the relationship between these factors and proxy advisor recommendations in a prior
article. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 650–51 (2009).
72 See, e.g., Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:

CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSFINAL

880

7/8/2010 2:55 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

characteristics that increase director effectiveness are difficult to identify,
many commentators agree on baseline attributes.73 In addition, while
shareholders may be dissatisfied with a board of directors for many reasons,
common reasons for concern include poor financial performance; corporate
misconduct, such as securities fraud; excessive executive compensation; and a
lack of responsiveness to shareholders.74
In an earlier article, we examined the relationship between these factors and
proxy advisor recommendations in uncontested director elections.75 In
particular, we examined the effect on recommendations of twenty-three
factors, including director-specific factors such as age and attendance, and
firm-specific factors such as financial performance, the existence of
antitakeover defenses, and the board’s failure to implement a previously
approved shareholder proposal. We found that the majority of our factors
affected the likelihood that at least one proxy advisor would issue a withhold
recommendation—although firm antitakeover defenses did not seem to play a
significant role. Moreover, while all of the proxy advisors considered a few
specific factors important—such as poor director attendance—on most issues
there was substantial variation. For example, ISS was significantly more likely
to issue a withhold recommendation when the company board had refused to
Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 921–39 (1996) (collecting empirical studies of board
composition and effectiveness); cf. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002) (finding no correlation
between director independence and long-term firm performance).
73 These include director independence both from the company and the CEO, limited service on other
corporate boards, and regular attendance at board meetings. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Walt Disney Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 50882 (Dec. 20, 2004) (“The independence of directors is a linchpin of sound
corporate governance, and is crucial to the objective oversight of management.”); PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA
M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 22–23 (2003) (stating that directors
should act “independently of management”); Stephen P. Ferris et al., Too Busy to Mind the Business?
Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087 (2003) (finding no evidence,
contrary to popular wisdom, that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities); Renée B. Adams & Daniel
Ferreira, Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors’ Incentives to Attend Board Meetings 304 (European
Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 203/2008, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=936261 (discussing various directives that directors attend board meetings regularly).
The federal proxy rules require issuers to disclose whether any director has attended fewer than 75% of the
board meetings held during the prior fiscal year. Schedule 14A. Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(f) (2009). The rules also require disclosure of outside directorships. Schedule
14A. Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 22(b) (2009).
74 See, e.g., Mark Anderson, Eli Lilly Heads CalPERS’ ‘Underperforming’ List, SACRAMENTO BUS. J.,
Mar. 19, 2009, http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/sacramento/stories/2009/03/16/daily56.html (describing
CalPERS’s (the California Public Employees’ Retirement System) watch list as targeting companies with
corporate governance defects that also “show weakness with profitability, transparency and/or management”).
75 See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 650–51.
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implement a shareholder resolution that had received majority shareholder
support. Glass Lewis was significantly more likely to issue a withhold
recommendation if the nominee was an inside director (other than the CEO).
Egan Jones was significantly more likely to issue a withhold recommendation
if the nominee was a board member at three or more other major companies.
Proxy Governance was significantly more likely to issue a withhold
recommendation if the company CEO received abnormally high
compensation.76
We found a substantial correlation between proxy advisor
recommendations and the factors that academics, policy makers, and the media
have identified as important. This correlation challenges the view that ISS and
the other proxy advisors are causally significant in determining the shareholder
vote because shareholders may themselves directly consider these factors
important. To the extent that the same factors independently affect both
shareholders’ voting behavior and the proxy advisor’s recommendation,
shareholder votes and recommendations will be correlated. However, the
recommendation will not be the cause of the shareholder vote. Any power or
influence inferred from such a correlation would be illusory.77
Of course, proxy advisors may be the source of the information underlying
shareholder voting decisions. When proxy advisors issue recommendations,
they provide more than a bottom line—more than a mere vote “for” or
“withhold.” Proxy advisors also provide additional information about the basis
for their recommendation.78 For example, a proxy advisor may explain that it
issued a withhold recommendation because the director is a member of a board
that failed to implement a shareholder resolution adopted with majority
shareholder support. Thus, a shareholder who cares about responsiveness to
such resolutions, but has neither the time nor the interest to research whether
the resolution won majority support and, if so, whether it has been
implemented, may obtain that information from the proxy advisor’s report.
The relevant underlying information is generally available to the public, but as
long as the shareholder is not willing to conduct the requisite research, the
proxy advisor’s report is likely to become the exclusive source of information
relevant to shareholder voting decisions. Under this circumstance, had the
76

Id. at 664–70.
Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 945 (1986).
78 See, e.g., ISS Governance Services, Proxy Alert, Citigroup Inc. 18 (Apr. 10, 2009) (stating that ISS
recommends shareholders withhold their votes for board nominee Anne Mulcahy because she may be
overextended as she sits on more than three boards and serves as CEO of Xerox Corporation).
77
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shareholder not subscribed to the services of the advisor, the shareholder
would not have learned of the information.
In such a case, the proxy advisor may well be the “but for” cause of the
shareholder vote. Nonetheless, it still may be inappropriate to attribute the
shareholder’s voting decision to the “power” of the proxy advisor. The advisor
is acting as a mere information agent. The underlying information provided by
the proxy advisor—not the bottom-line conclusion—is what affects the
shareholder vote.
The proxy advisor nonetheless exercises power as an information agent by
selecting, in its discretion, which information to report. For example, a proxy
advisor could, as a general matter, choose not to provide any information on
whether a board failed to implement a shareholder proposal, or it could provide
this information selectively.79 In either case, assuming that shareholders do not
otherwise obtain the underlying information, the proxy advisor is exercising
some power over the shareholder vote. In sum, to the extent that the
information provided by a proxy advisor affects the shareholder vote, the
proxy advisor has some limited influence, but inferring from this correlation
that the advisor has power over the shareholder vote is an overstatement.
Alternatively, some institutional investors may just look at the bottom line
of the proxy advisor and vote accordingly. That is, shareholders may rely on
the proxy advisor’s assessment of the underlying information, rather than
evaluating that information themselves.80 Even in such cases, however, the
extent of the proxy advisor’s power may be overstated. At least some
79 For example, the proxy advisor could provide information on the board’s failure to implement a
shareholder proposal only when the advisor was recommending a withhold vote and not when the advisor was
recommending a vote in favor of the nominees. In theory, proxy advisors could also misreport information.
The ability of advisors to exercise power consistently by misreporting is quite limited, however. In addition to
the market competition provided by other advisors, the company itself has a strong incentive to correct
inaccuracies, and the media is likely to report any substantial errors. Thus proxy advisors have incentives to
avoid recommendations that can be described as erroneous. Indeed, ISS received substantial adverse media
attention for its recommendation that shareholders withhold their votes from Warren Buffett, a nominee to the
Coca-Cola board, because of business relationships between Coca-Cola and some Berkshire Hathaway
subsidiaries. See, e.g., Donald E. Graham, The Gray Lady’s Virtue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at A17,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117728391033378436.html (describing ISS’s recommendation as
“perhaps the single silliest recommendation ever made to shareholders”).
80 The proxy voting guidelines of the Nathan Cummings Foundation, for example, reflect this role for the
proxy advisor, indicating that the Foundation will vote for a director nominee if the company does not have a
staggered board, if the company is not recommending against an issue proposal supported by the Foundation,
and if RiskMetrics supports the nominee. Proxy Voting Practices, The Nathan Cummings Foundation,
available at http://www.nathancummings.org/shareholders/pvgandvr/VotingGuidelines.pdf.
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investors will have substantial information about proxy advisors’
recommendations and the bases on which they are issued, and they may choose
to follow the recommendations of an advisor because they have concluded that
they usually agree with the proxy advisor’s decisions. Proxy advisors prepare
and distribute annual explanations of their voting policies to their clients,
identifying the factors that they consider important.81 Recognizing that
different institutions potentially have different objectives (primarily with
respect to shareholder resolutions), ISS in fact now offers different guidelines
tailored to the needs of union pension funds, public pension funds, and socially
responsible institutional investors.82 For most of these institutional investors,
many of which hold securities in hundreds or even thousands of issuers, the
most efficient way of deciding how to vote is to determine which proxy
advisor has a voting policy they most agree with and then to follow its
recommendations.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that institutions sometimes choose to
follow an advisor that has adopted certain voting policies to further their
business interests. For example, according to the SEC, INTECH, an
investment advisor, switched to ISS’s union fund voting guidelines in an effort
to generate more advisory business from union funds.83 While this may reflect
a conflict of interest between INTECH and its clients,84 it also indicates that
the choice of advisor is correlated with the advisor’s voting policies.
To the extent that an institutional investor chooses a proxy advisor based
on its voting policies, the proxy advisor exercises a degree of power, but this
power is contingent in two respects. First, the power derives from an ex ante
assessment by the advisor’s client that it is in general agreement with the way
the proxy advisor makes the recommendations. Second, to the extent that the
client ceases to be in agreement—because the client’s view (or its business

81 See, e.g., ISS GOVERNANCE SERVICES, 2008 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY (2007),
available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/2008PolicyUSSummaryGuidelines.pdf.
82 RiskMetrics, Proxy Advisory Services, http://www.riskmetrics.com/proxy_advisory/options (last
visited Aug. 11, 2009) (describing different voting guideline options).
83 See Thompson Hine, SEC Enters Order Against Adviser Related to Proxy Voting, May 22, 2009,
http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/publication1818.html (describing SEC action); Press Release,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Investment Adviser for Proxy Voting Rule Violations (May 8,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-105.htm.
84 The SEC noted that the INTECH decision created a potential conflict of interest in that “not all clients
would agree with votes made pursuant to the ISS-PVS Guidelines and that voting proxies pursuant to the ISSPVS Guidelines would benefit INTECH in obtaining and retaining union-affiliated clients.” Thompson Hine,
supra note 83.
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objective) has changed, because the advisor’s methodology has changed, or
because the client believes that there is a different advisor whose
recommendations coincide with the client’s views more closely—the client
may switch to another proxy advisor.
The degree of contingent power held by a proxy advisor depends on the
nature of competition in the market for proxy advisory services. An increase
in the number of proxy advisory firms, the extent to which the
recommendations of different advisors vary, and the transparency of the bases
of these recommendations will each increase the ability of an institution to
achieve a closer match between its voting preferences and the
recommendations of an advisor.85 To the extent the market for proxy advisory
services is sufficiently competitive, market forces will discipline proxy
advisors to make recommendations that conform to the preferences of current
and potential clients. Indeed, this analysis suggests that those proxy advisors
who appear to exercise the most power—i.e., those whose recommendations
are followed most often by shareholders—may have this apparent power not
because they exercise discretion in making voting recommendations, but rather
because they base their recommendations on criteria important to their clients.
To the extent this conclusion is correct, the criticism of proxy advisors as being
both powerful and unaccountable to shareholders would be substantially
muted.
Lastly, some shareholders may not care about how they vote their shares.
They may lack the resources, time, or expertise to evaluate voting decisions, or
they may engage in an investment strategy in which the outcome of
shareholder voting is irrelevant. Although some such investors simply refrain
from voting,86 others are legally required to make an informed vote.87
Subscribing to a proxy advisor and, in some cases, delegating complete voting
authority to that advisor,88 may be the most cost effective way of complying

85 See GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 13–14 (describing the market for proxy
advisory services).
86 William Baue, Report Urges Foundations to Vote Their Proxies, SOCIAL FUNDS, Mar. 4, 2004,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1358.html (describing the low level of proxy voting by
foundations and suggesting purchasing proxy voting service from ISS as a superior and reasonably priced
alternative to refraining from voting).
87 See Rose, supra note 16, at 897–98 (noting Department of Labor and SEC regulations).
88 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of
Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 324 (2008) (reporting that 20% of
public pension funds surveyed reported delegating complete voting authority to ISS or a similar organization).
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with that requirement.89 To the extent that the choice of the proxy advisor is
unrelated to the voting recommendations it issues, a proxy advisor may have
absolute power. The advisor may base its recommendations on factors that it
(or its staff) considers important and would face no short- or long-term
pressure to modify these factors because they do not mesh with the interests of
its clients. The causal power of proxy advisors to affect a shareholder vote is
strongest in this last form of proxy advisor influence. Note, however, that even
this absolute power is limited as long as a proxy advisor has other clients who
will periodically review its recommendations to determine whether they
coincide with their interests, and the advisor issues the same recommendation
to both sets of clients.
II. ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE SHAREHOLDER VOTE
We now proceed to examine the power of proxy advisors empirically. Our
dataset examines uncontested director elections in 2005 and 2006. We focus
only on director elections for companies listed in the S&P 1500 as of June 30
for the year prior to the director election (June 30, 2004 and June 30, 2005,
respectively). For each director in our sample of S&P 1500 companies, we
collected information about whether the director received a “for” or withhold
recommendation (or no recommendation) from ISS, Glass Lewis, Egan Jones,
and Proxy Governance.90
Table 1, Panel A presents some summary statistics on the coverage rates
and recommendations of the four proxy advisors. ISS, Glass Lewis, and Egan
Jones provided extensive coverage, issuing recommendations on 88% to 99%
of the director nominees in the sample. Proxy Governance, by contrast,
provided much more limited coverage—issuing recommendations on only
34% of the director nominees in the sample.

89 The SEC has specifically stated that investment advisors can comply with their fiduciary obligations
by using a ‘“predetermined voting policy,’ such as a third-party proxy voting service’s platform, to vote
proxies provided that the predetermined policy is ‘designed to further the interests of clients rather than the
adviser.’” INTECH Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2872, at 5 (May 7, 2009) (quoting
Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Managers, Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2106 (Jan. 31, 2003)),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/ia-2872.pdf.
90 Institutional Shareholder Services recommendations were obtained through LEXIS. Glass Lewis,
Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance provided us with their recommendations for the period in question. All of
the companies in our sample that conducted a director election in 2005 had a proxy advisor recommendation
for at least one of their directors.
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The advisors also differed significantly in their proclivity to issue a
withhold recommendation. Institutional Shareholder Services issued such
recommendations for only 6.8% of the directors it covered, and Proxy
Governance issued even fewer withholds at 3.7% of its recommendations. By
contrast, Glass Lewis’s withholds accounted for 18.8% of its
recommendations, and for Egan Jones, withholds accounted for 11%. Panel B
presents a correlation matrix of the recommendations made by the proxy
advisors. The correlation is uniformly positive, but low, indicating that
advisors make different decisions about whether to issue a withhold
recommendation.
These findings—together with the findings in our prior article that proxy
advisors base their recommendations on different factors91—highlight that
institutional investors have a real choice in selecting proxy advisors. They can
pick among advisors that differ both in how critical they are of board nominees
(as demonstrated by the overall rate of their withhold recommendations) and in
the criteria they use to assess those nominees. As a result, even institutions
that do not want to examine the bases for recommendations on a case-by-case
basis can nonetheless choose an advisor, or combination of advisors, to match
their preferences.
Table 1, Panels C and D, explore the general correlation between withhold
recommendations and the subsequent shareholder vote by providing data on
the relationship between the recommendations and the vote outcome. Panel C
shows the average percentage of “for” votes92 when a proxy advisor has issued
a “for” and a “withhold” recommendation. The last column of that table
displays the difference in these percentages as the marginal impact of a
withhold recommendation.
As Panel C shows, an ISS withhold
recommendation is associated with a 20.3% drop in the “for” vote. This drop
reflects a far higher percentage than for any of the other advisors. For Glass
Lewis, the drop is 6.2%, and for Egan Jones and Proxy Governance, it is 4.7%
and 3.5% respectively. The data in this table are consistent with the press
characterizations of ISS as the most powerful and Glass Lewis as the second
most powerful proxy advisor,93 and the marginal impact is within the range of

91
92

See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 649.
Percentage “for” vote is defined as the “for” votes as a percentage of the sum of “for” and withhold

votes.
93

See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.
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votes—albeit at the lower end—that media and prior academic reports have
claimed ISS controls.94
Note, however, that Panel C measures correlation, not causation. This
correlation reflects the combined effect of all of the relationships between the
shareholder vote and the ISS recommendation detailed in Part I above. Thus,
the 20% effect of an ISS recommendation may be due to a combination of the
following: (1) some shareholders conducting an independent analysis and
voting the way that ISS recommends without considering (or even knowing
about) the ISS recommendation; (2) some shareholders learning information
from ISS that affected their own assessment as well as the ISS
recommendation; (3) some shareholders following ISS based on their general
assessment of ISS’s voting policies;95 (who may switch if they find that ISS’s
voting policies in fact do not match their preferences); and (4) some
shareholders following ISS recommendations without regard to (or without
having) their own views on the issues.
In Panel D, we consider the combined effect of recommendations by
multiple proxy advisors. For ISS, the marginal impact of a recommendation is
pretty stable, regardless of what the other proxy advisors do—ranging from
17.6% to 21.4% depending upon whether another advisor (and which advisor)
has issued a “for” or a withhold recommendation. By contrast, the impact of
the other advisors seems to decline when the ISS recommendation is taken into
account.
Thus, holding the ISS recommendation constant, withhold
recommendations by Egan Jones and Proxy Governance affect less than 2% of
the vote. A withhold recommendation by Glass Lewis retains its earlier effect
(6.2% in Panel C compared to 6.5% in Panel D) when ISS also issued a
withhold recommendation. But the marginal impact of a Glass Lewis withhold
recommendation is only 3.6% of the vote when ISS issues a “for”
recommendation. In sum, when we combine the recommendations, the ISS
effect clearly dominates those of the other advisors. Although not conclusive,
these data suggest either that ISS’s recommendations are more closely aligned
with shareholders’ preferences, that other proxy advisors are far less influential
than ISS, or both.
Table 1, Panel E presents data on the distribution of shareholder votes. In
2005 and 2006, most directors were elected with a very high vote margin—an
94

See supra text accompanying notes 12–16.
These shareholders may switch if they find that ISS’s voting policies in fact do not match their
preferences.
95
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unsurprising outcome given that we examined uncontested elections during an
economic bubble in a period when broker discretionary voting was permitted.96
For 72% of the nominees, the margin is 95% or more of the vote, and for 89%
of the nominees, the margin exceeds 90%. Only 4% of the nominees received
a “for” vote of less than 80%. It is important to remember that, in uncontested
elections, shareholders make a significant statement simply by withholding a
higher percentage of votes than normal. Thus, given that the average “for”
vote is 95%, a “for” vote of 80% could be considered a rebuff or an
embarrassment to a director.97 Indeed, issuers have become increasingly
responsive to substantial (but less than majority) withhold votes, even though
such votes have no direct impact on the composition of the board.98
III. INDEPENDENT FACTORS AFFECTING THE SHAREHOLDER VOTE
We now probe further into the effect of underlying firm and director factors
and advisor recommendations on vote outcomes. As in our prior research, we
collected information about various publicly available factors that, based on
corporate governance literature, we posit may influence the shareholder vote.
We obtained data regarding the characteristics of both individual director
nominees and the company for which the director was being nominated. With
respect to individual directors, we obtained data99 on: (1) whether the director
was the CEO (CEO), a non-executive chairman (Chairman Only), an employee
of the company other than the CEO (Empl_Dir), an outside director with
certain links to the company (OutDirLink), or a new Director (New Director);
(2) whether the director was a member of the audit committee (AuditMbr), the
compensation committee (CompMbr), or the nominating committee

96 See infra text accompanying note 135. Since 2006, the number of directors with high withhold votes
has increased. See GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 7 (describing the increase in the number of high withhold
votes).
97 GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 7 (charting the number of directors who received a withhold vote of
20% or more).
98 See Cai et al., supra note 13, at 2390; Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When
Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84 (2008) (finding operating performance
improvement and increased CEO turnover in response to successful “vote no” campaigns).
99 These data were obtained from the RiskMetrics-Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
director database, available to subscribers of Wharton Research Data Services. The IRRC dataset consists of
data on individual board directors from 1996 to 2006. The data include “a range of variables related to
individual board directors (e.g., name, age, tenure, gender, committee memberships, independence
classification, primary employer and title, number of other public company boards serving on, shares owned,
etc.).” See RiskMetrics-Directors Legacy Data Request, Wharton Research Data Services (on file with
authors).
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(NomMbr); and (3) whether the director was a member of at least three other
“major” company boards during the year prior to the annual meeting date
(ManyBds),100 whether the director attended less than 75% of the director
meetings (Attendance), whether the director held at least 20% of the
company’s stock (BlockDir), whether the director was an interlocking director
(Interlock), and whether the director was 75 years or older (Age75).
For each company in our sample, we obtained data101 on (1) whether the
first public report of a restatement to the company’s financial statement
occurred within two years prior to the annual meeting (Prior Restat), whether
the first public statement of an SEC investigation or enforcement action
occurred within two years prior to the annual meeting (Prior SEC), and
whether the company rejected an issue proposal that had received majority
shareholder support in the last year (IP No); (2) whether the company had a
classified board (ClassBd), a poison pill (PPill), cumulative voting (CumVote),
or golden parachutes (GP); (3) whether the company was in the top or bottom
5% of the companies ranked based on the abnormal holding period return for
the three-year period prior to the meeting date for the year of the
recommendation (Top5AbRet, Bot5Abret);102 and (4) whether the CEO for the
company was in the top 5% for total excess compensation (Top5AbComp).103
We hypothesize that all factors other than new director, CEO, nonexecutive chairman, and top 5% abnormal return are associated with a decline
in “for” votes for a particular director. As most shareholders typically vote for
a company’s nominees in an uncontested election,104 it is likely that withhold
votes are triggered by specific problems with a particular director or the
100 We use the IRRC data on other “major” company boards held by directors for the year prior to the
annual meeting.
101 These data were obtained from SEC filings, press releases, the IRRC Governance database, the
Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance Reviews, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
All of the data are publicly available or based on publicly available sources.
102 The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the raw three-year holding period return for
the company in question and the three-year holding period return for the CRSP value weighted market index.
103 Top5AbComp is an indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the total excess compensation for the
CEO for the company in question is in the top 5% of the sample and 0 otherwise. We define total excess CEO
compensation as the difference between the total CEO compensation for the year prior to the meeting date (as
provided by the Compustat Executive Compensation database) minus the expected total CEO compensation.
We calculate the expected total CEO compensation by (1) estimating an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model
for: ln(Total CEO compensation) = α + β1ln(Market_Capitalization) +β2One_Year_Abnormal_Holding_
Period_Return + β3Year_2006 + ε and (2) using the predicted Total CEO compensation based on this model as
the expected Total CEO compensation.
104 See, e.g., GEORGESON, supra note 36, at 8 (reporting that, in 2008, only thirty directors at S&P 1500
companies failed to receive a majority of “for” votes, compared to fifteen directors in 2007).
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company as a whole. Directors who may not perform their duties as
effectively as other directors (due to low attendance, posts on multiple boards,
or old age) may receive a greater proportion of withhold votes. Shareholders
may look negatively on directors who lack independence or have conflicts of
interest (including employee directors other than the CEO, outside directors
with linked affiliations with the company, directors with substantial block
shareholdings, and directors that have interlocking board relationships with the
company). Company problems such as poor performance, a restatement, or an
SEC investigation may trigger a withhold vote, as may a lack of board
responsiveness to investors, indicated by the failure to adopt a shareholderapproved issue proposal. Shareholders, particularly institutional investors,
may also view the presence of antitakeover mechanisms as a lack of board
responsiveness.
We also hypothesize that shareholders tailor their voting to hold directors
who sit on key committees more responsible for certain problems. Thus
shareholders may be more likely to hold members of audit committees
responsible for audit-related problems, or they may be more likely to withhold
votes from members of the compensation committee if a company overpays its
CEO.
We view shareholder voting for a CEO-director as categorically different.
A significant withhold vote on the CEO may both send a strong signal of
dissatisfaction (because the CEO, in many ways, personifies the current
management policy of the company), but it may also entail greater costs
(leading to the CEO’s resignation, possibly without a successor in place). We
hypothesize a decreased likelihood of a withhold recommendation for new
directors because shareholders are not likely to hold them responsible for prior
problems. We also hypothesize a decreased likelihood of a withhold
recommendation for non-executive chairmen because they are likely both to
reflect company responsiveness to shareholder demands and to be selected for
factors valued by shareholders such as expertise and independence. For
obvious reasons, we similarly hypothesize a decreased likelihood of withhold
recommendations for directors of companies that rank in the top 5% of
abnormal return.
In Table 2, we present some summary statistics about the distribution of
these variables as well as a univariate analysis of the relationship between
these variables and the voting outcome. For the variables for which we had a
prediction, all but five yield a statistically significant difference in the vote
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outcome in the predicted direction. The remaining five variables (audit
committee membership, chairman only, cumulative vote, golden parachute,
and top abnormal returns) do not yield a statistically significant difference.
The results of the univariate analysis, however, should be viewed with care.
This is especially true for the variables associated with board or employment
status (CEO; membership on the audit, compensation, or nominating
committee; chairman only; employee director; and outside-linked director)
because these variables are negatively correlated with each other. For
example, a CEO cannot also be a chairman-only, an employee director, or an
outside-linked director. As the key committees tend to consist only of
independent directors, a CEO or an employee director will generally not be on
the audit, compensation, or nominating committee.105 Additionally, given
some notion of fair distribution of work among outside directors, a director
generally does not serve on more than one of these committees at the same
time.
We also hypothesize interactions between these variables. Specifically, we
hypothesize: (1) that the presence of audit and disclosure-related problems
(prior audits or restatements) may have a particularly strong adverse impact on
members of the audit committee;106 (2) that the presence of compensationrelated problems (abnormally high compensation) may have a particularly
strong adverse impact on members of the compensation committee;107 (3) that
an abnormal positive or negative return may have a particularly strong impact

105 See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.03, 303A.07(b) (2009); NASDAQ, Inc.,
Stock Market Equity Rules § 5605 (Mar. 12, 2009) (describing the composition of the audit committee
(5605(c)(2)), independent director executive compensation (5605(d)), and independent director oversight of
director
nominations
(5605(d))),
available
at
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F.
106 Studies have demonstrated relationships between audit committee composition and audit-related
problems. See, e.g., Bradley Pomeroy & Daniel B. Thornton, Meta-Analysis and the Accounting Literature:
The Case of Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality, 17 EUR. ACCT. REV. 305, 310–
11 (2008) (summarizing twenty-seven empirical studies examining the relationship between audit committee
independence and financial reporting quality); Joseph V. Carcello et al., Audit Committee Financial Expertise,
Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (Working paper, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887512 (finding that “independent audit committee members with financial
expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings management”).
107 See, e.g., Ronald C. Anderson & John M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO
and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1323, 1332–36 (2003)
(discussing compensation committee independence and CEO presence on the compensation committee as
mechanisms for dealing with potential agency issues in setting CEO pay).
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on the CEO;108 and (4) that membership on many boards may have a different
impact on the CEO than on other board members. (This impact could be more
positive because it serves as a signal of quality or more negative because of
concerns that the CEO is spending excess time on non-company business.)
Table 2.1 reports that the “for” vote outcome correlates significantly with three
of these interaction terms (Prior Restat x AuditMbr, Prior SEC x AuditMbr,
and Top5AbComp x CompMbr).
We will refer to variables and interacted variables other than the vote
recommendations as “underlying factors.” Our prior research demonstrates
that most of these variables (other than those related to takeovers)109 are
significantly related to a withhold recommendation by at least one proxy
advisor.110 As at least some proxy advisors base their recommendations on
these variables, it is plausible that shareholders may give independent weight
to these factors in determining their votes—either because they have
independent information about these underlying factors or because they obtain
this information through the proxy advisor’s analysis. Finally, even though
takeover-related factors do not appear to affect the recommendations of proxy
advisors, we nevertheless include them in our analysis because these factors
are often identified as important indicators of governance quality,111 may affect
firm value,112 and are within the control of the board.113
We next examine (in Table 3) the relationship between the “for” vote
outcome and our identified, publicly available underlying factors in a
multivariate model. We first estimate a regression with a log odds
108 See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453–54
(1988) (finding that firms with independent boards are more likely to remove the CEO on the basis of poor
stock performance).
109 We regard ClassBd, PPill, CumVote, and GP as takeover-related factors.
110 See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 649.
111 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
112 See id. (finding a relationship between equity prices and various corporate governance variables).
113 Boards generally can adopt poison pills and golden parachutes without shareholder approval. See, e.g.,
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of directors has the
power to adopt a poison pill under Delaware law); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 953–54 (Del. 1985) (outlining a board’s broad powers to act unilaterally). In contrast, addition or
removal of a classified board (otherwise known as a staggered board) or a cumulative voting structure
typically requires both board and shareholder approval. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 894 (2002)
(“[D]ismantling [a staggered board] that is in the charter requires both a shareholder vote and a board
vote . . . .”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 124, 161 (1994) (“[T]he elimination of cumulative voting in a specific firm ordinarily requires
shareholder approval . . . .”).

CHOIFISCHKAHAN GALLEYSF

2010]

7/8/2010 2:55 PM

THE POWER OF PROXY ADVISORS

893

transformation of the “for” vote outcome as a dependent variable.114 For
independent variables we use publicly available factors with the following
additions: We add interaction variables for Prior Restat x AuditMbr, Prior SEC
x AuditMbr, Top5AbComp x CompMbr, Bot5AbRet x CEO, Top5AbRet x
CEO, and ManyBds x CEO. As further controls, we add variables for the
percentage of shares held by institutional investors (InstHold); the percentage
of the vote held by all board members (Tot_Dir_Shs); firm size (lmktcap, the
log of the firm’s market capitalization); risk (sdret, the standard deviation of
the company’s returns for the one-year period prior to the annual meeting
date). We also add a dummy variable for whether the election took place in
2005 or 2006 (Year06).
For the base model (reported as Model 1 in Table 3), we do not include any
proxy advisor recommendations. In the base model, virtually every underlying
factor significantly affects the shareholder vote, either on its own or as part of
an interaction variable. As predicted, the following are associated with a
reduced “for” vote: membership on audit, compensation, or nominating
committees; status as outside-linked or employee director; poor attendance;
age 75 years or older; a prior SEC investigation; a prior restatement (for audit
committee members only); payment of abnormally high compensation (for
compensation committee members only); membership on many boards (for
non-CEOs); ignoring a shareholder proposal; and abnormally low stock
returns. Status as a new director and abnormally high stock returns are each
associated with an increased “for” vote. In addition, we find that CEOs get a
lower percentage of “for” votes than other directors. With regard to the
takeover-related factors, only the presence of a classified board is associated

114

While the vote outcome for any director election is continuous, the vote outcome is bounded by zero
and one. Estimating an ordinary least squares model on a bounded dependent variable results in biased
coefficients. We employ a log odds transformation of the vote outcome to generate an unbounded, continuous
variable allowing for ordinary least squares estimation of the relationship between the vote outcome and our
independent variables of interest. We compute the log odds of the vote outcome as follows: For the dependent
variable for a particular proxy advisor, we compute a term X = 0.5/n, where n is the number of data points
where “for” vote data exists for directors with a recommendation from the particular proxy advisor in question.
We then use the log((VOTE + X)/(1-VOTE + X)) as the dependent variable (to avoid division by zero problems
when the “for” vote fraction is equal to 1).
To control for the possibility that errors for directors in the same company may be correlated we use
standard errors clustered by company in the models of Table 3. Unreported, we re-estimate the base model
(Model 1 of Table 3) using non-clustered, robust standard errors and obtain similar qualitative results, except
that both PPill and CumVote are now significant (at the <1% and 10% levels respectively), and Bot5AbRet x
CEO is insignificant.
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with a significant decrease in the “for” vote. No underlying factor is
significant in the opposite of the predicted direction.
As with the analysis in Part II, however, the associations in the base
regressions between the underlying factor variables and the shareholder vote
reflect correlation, not causation. Significantly, the impact of these variables
may be mediated because they affect proxy advisor recommendations rather
than directly influencing shareholder votes. We address this issue in Model 2
by adding an indicator variable for the ISS recommendation (VoteISS):
assigning a value of 1 if ISS issued a withhold recommendation and 0 if ISS
issued a “for” recommendation. In Models 3, 4, and 5, we do the same for
recommendations by Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance.
Having both the ISS recommendation and the underlying factors in the
same regression permits us, to some extent, to separate the effects of the two
types of variables on the election results. To the extent that the underlying
factors affect the vote outcome independently of the ISS recommendation—
either because voters pay direct attention to these factors or because voters pay
attention to other proxy advisors who pay attention to these factors—the effect
should persist even after controlling for the ISS recommendation. Indeed,
when we add the variable for the ISS recommendation, there is almost no
qualitative distinction between Models 1 and 2 in the significance levels of the
underlying factors. All variables retain their statistical significance with the
exception that one variable (Interlock) that was not significant in the base
model is now significant at the 10% level (in the predicted direction) in Model
2. The levels of significance change from Model 1 to Model 2 for only Prior
Restat x AuditMbr (which decreases from a 5% to a 10% level) and
Bot5AbRet x CEO (which increases from a 10% to a 5% level). To test the
continuing importance of the underlying factors even with the ISS
recommendation, we perform an F-test of the joint hypothesis that no
independent variable except the ISS recommendation variable is significantly
different from zero. The p-value of the F-test is 0.0000, which indicates that
the other independent variables add significance to the explanatory power of
the “for” vote ordinary least squares model.
The variable for the ISS recommendation in Model 2 is also highly
significant. This provides compelling evidence that the ISS recommendation
has independent significance—that vote outcome is not driven exclusively by
the underlying factors included in our regression. In addition, the magnitude
of the ISS recommendation variable is higher than any other single variable,
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and inclusion of the ISS recommendation greatly increases the predictive
power of the regression (the adjusted R-squared increases from .109 to .185).
In short, ISS’s recommendation matters.
A. The Impact of an ISS Recommendation
Finding that the ISS recommendation matters leads to the next question:
How much does it matter? To get a better sense of the quantitative impact of
the ISS withhold recommendation on the “for” vote percentage, we calculate
the predicted change in the “for” vote outcome—depending on whether ISS
makes a “for” or withhold recommendation. We find that this effect varies
depending on the overall level of the vote in favor of the director candidate.
Thus Table 4 reports the effect at various points along the log-odds “for” vote
distribution.
For example, calculations show that the ISS withhold
recommendation reduces the predicted “for” vote by 13.1% (from 98.1% to
85.4%) at the fiftieth percentile of the log-odds “for” vote distribution.115 At
the twenty-fifth percentile, an ISS withhold recommendation has a stronger
impact, reducing the predicted “for” vote by 17.0%. On the other hand, at the
seventy-fifth percentile, an ISS withhold recommendation has a weaker
impact, reducing the predicted “for” vote by 10.1%.
The quantitative impact of the ISS variable reflected in Table 4 likely
overstates the actual impact of the ISS recommendation. One of the challenges
of the multivariate regression models in Table 3 (used to compute the marginal
impacts reported in Table 4) is that they are incomplete. Although we have
endeavored to identify many of the publicly available factors that may
influence the shareholder vote, it is likely that we have failed to identify and
control for all such factors.116 This reflects the standard omitted variable
115

These percentiles were calculated using the actual distribution of all independent variables except the
variable for the ISS vote recommendation, which was set to zero (the baseline “for” recommendation).
116 Research indicates, for example, that shareholders affiliated with the AFL-CIO may consider the
interests of union workers when voting in director elections. See, e.g., Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting 30 (N.Y.U. Stern Working
Paper Series, No. FIN-08-006, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1285084 (finding evidence that labor relations affect the voting behavior of some union shareholders).
Considerations of corporate social responsibility may influence other shareholders. See Thomas W. Joo,
Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 955, 956–57 (2005) (describing the potential
role of shareholder power in increasing racial justice and social responsibility). Shareholders may care about
the board’s position on current as well as previously submitted shareholder proposals. See NATHAN
CUMMINGS FOUND., supra note 80, at 1 (indicating that the Foundation will vote for company nominees if,
inter alia, “[t]he board does not recommend a vote AGAINST a shareholder proposal that the Foundation
supports”).
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problem in regression analyses. As long as we do not control for these factors,
the ISS variable will include both the direct effect of the variable and the effect
of these omitted factors—thus potentially overstating the importance of the ISS
recommendation in explaining the “for” vote outcome. The coefficient
estimates for the VoteISS dummy variable represent the upper bound of any
direct effect of the ISS recommendation, but the true effect of the ISS
recommendation may be lower, even much lower.
The extent to which our model overstates the significance of the ISS
recommendation depends on how many underlying factors we have omitted
from the regression, the importance of these factors, and their correlation with
the ISS recommendation. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that
some of the variables we have identified and used in the regressions are
imprecise proxies for an actual problem with a director or company. This is
true specifically for the variables for CEO status and for membership on the
audit, compensation, or nominating committee. For example, shareholders are
not automatically going to vote against a director because the director is a
member of the compensation committee (nor is ISS more likely to recommend
a withhold vote against such a director because of his or her committee
membership). Rather, membership on the audit, compensation, or nominating
committee may result in a withhold vote or withhold recommendation because
voters or ISS hold the committee responsible for problems under its purview.
In our regression, we control for only a few potential problems: high CEO
compensation for compensation committee members; restatements and SEC
investigations for audit committee members; and performance and membership
on other boards for CEOs.
In addition to being underinclusive, our proxies are overinclusive—not
every restatement reflects adversely on the current audit committee. More
generally, given the nature of our empirical analysis and the size of our data
set, we can include only the factors that are easily available, quantifiable, and
generalizable across a large number of firms and directors. Neither proxy
advisors (which have a sizeable full-time staff) nor shareholders are confined
in this manner. We thus expect that our regressions fail to include a large
number of important underlying factors that presumably also affect the ISS
recommendation.
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B. Contingent Versus Absolute Power
We did not find any variable that was both (i) associated with an increased
likelihood of an ISS withhold recommendation as reported in our earlier
article117 and (ii) associated with a reduced “for” vote in the regressions
reported in Table 3. Similarly, we did not find any variable that was both (i)
associated with a reduced likelihood of an ISS withhold recommendation and
(ii) associated with an increased “for” vote in the regressions reported in Table
3. This is true whether or not we control for the ISS recommendation. Thus,
we have not identified any factor that ISS views as negative but shareholders
view as positive (or vice versa). This, incidentally, is not true for Glass Lewis.
In our earlier article, we found that Glass Lewis is less likely to issue withhold
recommendations for CEOs,118 but here we find that CEOs receive a
significantly higher withhold vote from shareholders than do non-CEOs for all
the models reported in Table 3.
Moreover, most of the factors that we identified in our earlier article as
having a statistically significant impact on the ISS recommendation119 remain
significant in explaining the voting outcome even after controlling for the ISS
recommendation in Model 2 of Table 3. Specifically, the following factors are
associated with a lower likelihood of a “for” recommendation by ISS and, after
controlling for the ISS recommendation, with a lower “for” shareholder vote
percentage: CEO status, membership on the compensation committee,
abnormal compensation (for compensation committee members), lack of
attendance, membership on multiple boards (for non-CEOs), membership on
the nominating committee, status as an employee or outside-linked director,
ignoring a shareholder proposal, and having a classified board. New director
status is associated with a higher likelihood of a “for” recommendation by ISS
(as identified in our earlier article) and, after controlling for the ISS
recommendation, a higher “for” vote percentage in Model 2 of Table 3.120
Furthermore, the four most important factors affecting an ISS
recommendation—ignoring a shareholder proposal, poor attendance at board
meetings, status as outside-linked director, and status as employee

117

Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 665.
Id. at 695.
119 Id. at 665.
120 Only two factors that were significant for the ISS recommendation—status as non-executive chairman
and golden parachutes, both of which reduced the likelihood of a withhold recommendation—are not
significant in the vote regressions. Compare id. at 665, with id. at 671–72.
118
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director121—were also among the six most important factors (together with the
ISS recommendation itself and status as CEO) affecting the vote outcome.
Institutional Shareholder Services is the only advisor for which CEO status is
associated with an increased likelihood of a withhold recommendation as
reported in our earlier article, and it is associated with a reduction in the “for”
vote percentage in Model 2 of Table 3. The relationship between the factors
that independently affect the ISS recommendations and the vote outcome
suggests that ISS is in sync with the sentiments of shareholders. In essence,
ISS generally gives the same directional weight to company and director
attributes in making its voting recommendation as do shareholders in making
their voting decisions.122
The results for the separate regressions involving the other proxy advisors
(reported in Table 3 as Models 3, 4, and 5) follow the same basic pattern as the
results for ISS. Specifically, for each advisor, the dummy variable for a
withhold recommendation is negative and significant, and most attribute
variables that were significant in the base regression remain so. The marginal
effect of a withhold recommendation by the advisors, calculated in the same
manner as discussed above for ISS, is reported in Table 4. In each case, the
upper-bound estimate of the direct effect is significantly smaller than the
respective estimate for ISS. Glass Lewis has a larger upper-bound effect, and
the estimates for Proxy Governance and Egan Jones are similar to each
other.123
The results further suggest that these advisors are less in sync with
shareholders than ISS. For example, the four most important factors affecting
the recommendations of Egan Jones and Proxy Governance do not correspond

121

Id. at 671–72.
This alignment is unlikely to be coincidental. Institutional Shareholder Services explicitly seeks
shareholder input in formulating its voting policies, surveying institutional investors on a yearly basis. See
RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2009–2010 RISKMETRICS POLICY SURVEY 4 (2009) (describing how feedback from
both institutional investors and issuers is part of RiskMetrics’s annual policy-formulation process).
123 As a robustness test, we re-estimated the “for” vote outcomes for Proxy Governance (PGI), Glass
Lewis (GL), and Egan Jones (EJ) recommendations using a Tobit model. Unreported, the coefficients on
VotePGI (-0.025), VoteGL (-0.052), and VoteEJ (-0.037) are all significantly different from zero. Note that
the upper bounds of influence for PGI (2.5 percentage points), GL (5.2 percentage points), and EJ (3.7
percentage points) are again smaller than for ISS. We also re-estimated the “for” vote outcomes for PGI, GL,
and EJ recommendations using an OLS model with the untransformed “for” vote outcome as the dependent
variable. Unreported, the coefficients on VotePGI (-0.023), VoteGL (-0.050), and VoteEJ (-0.035) are all
significantly different from zero. Note that the upper bounds of influence for PGI (2.3 percentage points), GL
(5.0 percentage points), and EJ (3.5 percentage points) are again smaller than for ISS.
122
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closely to the factors affecting the shareholder vote.124 Although ignoring a
shareholder proposal is an important factor in explaining the shareholder vote
in all the regressions of Table 3, it is not a significant factor in explaining
recommendations by Egan Jones and Proxy Governance.125 As to Glass Lewis
and ISS, the regressions of Table 3 show a significant overlap in the most
important factors affecting the recommendation.126 But Glass Lewis gives
strong positive weight to CEO status (i.e., CEOs are less likely to receive a
withhold recommendation),127 whereas CEO status is associated with a lower
“for” vote.
These findings have two implications: First, they suggest that the effect of
an ISS recommendation, as reflected in our measurements, may include a fair
degree of contingent power. Our results indicate that shareholders are basing
their votes on considerations similar to those that ISS uses in making its
recommendations, whether shareholders are following ISS’s recommendation
or not. Most of the factors we identified as affecting the ISS recommendation
also independently affect the shareholder vote, and both ISS and shareholders
consider the same factors as most important. This allows us to infer that many
institutions that follow ISS’s recommendations do so because they generally
agree with the basis for ISS’s voting recommendations. Second, the findings
suggest that ISS’s market position, and to a lesser extent Glass Lewis’s market
position, may be due, at least in part, to the fact that their recommendations
reflect client views better than those of the other proxy advisors. While
catering to clients’ views may explain ISS’s market dominance, it also
suggests the limits of such dominance—if ISS were to shift its
recommendations away from the views of its clients, it would likely lose those
clients to competing advisory firms.

124 The most important factors affecting Egan Jones’s recommendation are attendance, membership on
multiple boards, outside-linked status, and membership on the nominating committee. The most important
factors for Proxy Governance’s recommendation are attendance, high compensation, membership on the
compensation committee, and age. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 71, at 671–72.
125 Id. at 672.
126 The four most important factors affecting the ISS recommendation were also among the five most
important factors accounting for a withhold recommendation for Glass Lewis. Id. at 671–72. The fifth Glass
Lewis factor significantly associated with a withhold recommendation, board interlock, was present only in
25% of the sample.
127 Id. at 671.
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C. ISS and Glass Lewis
The data in Table 1, Panels A and B, suggest that the marginal impact of
Glass Lewis’s recommendations may be affected by the recommendation made
by ISS. In Table 5, Panel A, we start with the base model (reported as Model 1
in Table 3) and include separate indicator variables for the recommendations of
ISS and Glass Lewis as well as an interacted indicator variable taking the value
of 1 if both ISS and Glass Lewis issued a withhold recommendation. In this
regression, the indicator variable for the ISS recommendation (VoteISS)
measures the impact of an ISS withhold recommendation on the “for” vote
outcome when Glass Lewis has issued a “for” recommendation. Similarly, the
indicator variable for Glass Lewis (VoteGL) measures the impact of a Glass
Lewis withhold recommendation on the “for” vote outcome when ISS has
issued a “for” recommendation. The sum of the indicator variable for ISS
(VoteISS) and the interacted indicator variable (VoteISS x VoteGL) measures
the impact of an ISS withhold recommendation when Glass Lewis has also
issued a withhold recommendation. The sum of the indicator variable for
Glass Lewis (VoteGL) plus the interacted indicator variable (VoteISS x
VoteGL) measures the impact of a Glass Lewis withhold recommendation
when ISS has also issued a withhold recommendation.
In Table 5, Panel A, the variables for both the ISS and Glass Lewis
recommendations are negative and significant, indicating that a withhold
recommendation by either advisor reduces the “for” vote percentage. At the
median of the log-odds “for” vote distribution, assuming that Glass Lewis has
issued a “for” recommendation, the predicted change in the “for” vote outcome
is -14.5 percentage points when ISS issues a withhold recommendation. In
contrast, assuming ISS has issued a “for” recommendation, the predicted
change in the “for” vote outcome is -3.1 percentage points when Glass Lewis
issues a withhold recommendation. If ISS issues a withhold recommendation,
the predicted marginal effect of Glass Lewis also issuing a withhold
recommendation (the sum of VoteGL and VoteISS x VoteGL) is insignificant.
However, if Glass Lewis issues a withhold recommendation, the predicted
marginal effect of ISS also issuing a withhold recommendation (the sum of
VoteISS and VoteISS x VoteGL) is negative and significant; the predicted
change in the “for” vote outcome (measured at the mean level of the other
control variables) is -13.2 percentage points.128

128

See infra tbl.5, Panel B.
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These results are consistent with those in the univariate analysis (Table 2)
and suggest that a Glass Lewis withhold recommendation has a greater impact
on the vote if ISS has issued a “for” recommendation than if ISS has issued a
withhold recommendation. This suggests the possibility that some institutional
investors automatically will vote in favor of the board’s nominees if both ISS
and Glass Lewis issue “for” recommendations, but not if one of them issues a
withhold recommendation. Alternatively, it may indicate that there are some
underlying factors that both Glass Lewis and shareholders (but not ISS)
consider relevant when voting. The recommendations by the other two proxy
advisors have only a small, if any, effect on the vote outcome.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS INDIVIDUAL TEST
Proxy advisors provide recommendations and supporting research to their
subscribers, which include mutual funds, pension funds, foundations, and other
institutional investors.129 Individual shareholders generally do not employ the
services of these advisors, and advisors typically do not provide public access
to their recommendations and underlying research.130 In some high profile
elections such as those involving a proxy contest131 or merger,132 interested
parties may issue a press release disclosing a proxy advisor’s recommendation.
It is thus likely that recommendations directly affect only the vote of
institutional investors (some of which are clients of these advisors), not the
vote of individual investors (who are not clients).
We therefore construct a test designed to measure the power of ISS by
capturing the differential in voting between individual investors and
institutional investors. We estimate the base regression (Model 1 of Table 3)

129

GAO, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER, supra note 1, at 9–10.
See Alexander, et al., supra note 65, at 8 (“The core business of ISS and other proxy advisors is to
supply institutional investors with vote recommendations on a subscription basis.”). Institutional Shareholder
Services’s recommendations and reports are now available on LEXIS and are also available on Westlaw
through a premium subscription.
131 See, e.g., Press Release, Starboard Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd. and Ramius Capital Group
LLC, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), A Leading Independent Proxy Advisory Firm, Supports
Ramius’ Independent Nominees for Election to the A. Schulman Board of Directors (Jan. 7, 2008), available
at http://www.euroinvestor.co.uk/news/story.aspx?id=9692387&bw=20080107005892 (reporting that ISS and
Glass Lewis supported the appointment of dissident nominees to the A. Schulman Board of Directors). Media
reports typically are a response to a press release, and press releases are most common in contested elections.
132 See, e.g., Press Release, Arris, ISS and Glass Lewis Each Recommend Merger of ARRIS and C-COR
(Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.arrisi.com/press_events/press_releases/pressdetail.asp?id=389
(reporting ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations in favor of proposed merger).
130
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by substituting a dummy variable for the recommendation with two interaction
variables. First, we multiply a dummy variable for the recommendation
(VoteISS taking a value of 1 if the ISS recommendation is withhold and 0 if
the ISS recommendation is “for”) by the fraction of shares held by institutional
investors (Insthold). Second, we multiply a dummy variable for the
recommendation by the fraction of shares held neither by institutional investors
nor by board members as a proxy for holdings by individual investors
(Indivhold).133 Given the assumption that individuals do not directly receive
the ISS recommendation, we posit that any relationship between an ISS
withhold recommendation and votes by individual investors (Indivhold x
VoteISS) must be the result of individuals responding to some other observable
factor that is not directly included in our regressions,134 but for which the ISS
recommendation in our model acts as a proxy. We then use the differential
between Insthold x VoteISS and Indivhold x VoteISS to estimate the effect of
ISS’s influence on the proxy vote.
Table 6 reports the results of the regression with the Insthold x VoteISS
and Indivhold x VoteISS interaction variables. The coefficients for the
Insthold x VoteISS interaction terms are more negative than the coefficients
for the Indivhold x VoteISS interaction terms. In unreported F-tests, the
difference in coefficients is significant at the <1% level. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that an ISS withhold recommendation has a
greater impact on voting by institutions than by individuals.
The results also enable us to estimate the effect of an ISS recommendation.
We start by making the following three assumptions: First, a recommendation
affects the vote of some institutional—but not any individual—investors.
Second, if they did not follow ISS, institutional investors would base their
votes on the same underlying factors as individual investors. Third, ISS does
not provide to its clients any additional information about these underlying
factors that is not known to individual investors.
Under these assumptions, the voting record of individual investors is a
perfect proxy for how institutional investors would vote if ISS did not exist.
This is so because the votes by individual investors are not themselves affected
by ISS (first assumption) and because institutions would vote the same way as
133 “Insthold” is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares of the company in question in the hands of
institutional investors, measured using Form 13-F data obtained from Thomson Financial for the time period
immediately prior to the annual meeting date. “Indivhold” is defined as 1 – InstHold – Tot_Dir_Shs.
134 See discussion of potentially omitted variables supra Part III.A.
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individuals but for ISS (second assumption). Moreover, any influence of ISS
is entirely due to its bottom-line recommendation, not to any information and
analysis accompanying its recommendation (third assumption). The power of
ISS thus can be measured by the difference in the coefficients for the
interaction term with institutional holdings and the interaction term with
individual holdings (for example, a difference of -1.889 for ISS). This variable
will measure any absolute power by ISS as well as any contingent power, but
only to the extent that ISS clients would have voted differently had they not
followed ISS.
Because our dependent variable is the log odds of the “for” vote, we use the
following methodology to quantify ISS’s power. We start with the overall
marginal impact of 13.1 percentage points from an ISS withhold
recommendation on the base “for” vote model measured at the median of the
log-odds “for” vote distribution (as reported in Table 4). We then apportion
the overall marginal impact of an ISS withhold recommendation between the
effect on institutional and individual holdings. For our entire sample, the mean
fraction of institutional ownership is 0.60, and the mean fraction of individual
holdings is 0.35. In the model, the coefficient estimate for Insthold x ISS is 3.137, and for Indivhold x ISS it is -1.248. Therefore, we calculate the relative
contribution of the Insthold x ISS variable on the overall marginal impact of an
ISS withhold recommendation as (3.137*0.60)/(3.137*0.60 + 1.248*0.35) =
81.2%.
Stated differently, the marginal impact of an ISS withhold
recommendation is 10.6 points of the 13.1 overall marginal impact. The
relative contribution of the Indivhold x ISS variable is 18.8% (or 2.5
percentage points of the 13.1 overall marginal impact). This suggests that an
ISS withhold recommendation reduces the “for” vote of institutional holders
by 17.7% (10.6/60) and the “for” vote by individual holders by 7.0 % (2.5/35).
If, as assumed, the relationship between the ISS recommendation and the vote
is due to other factors correlated with the ISS recommendation, not the
recommendation itself, and these factors have the same impact on the
institutional vote, then the real effect of an ISS withhold recommendation is to
reduce the institutional “for” vote by 10.7 percentage points of the institutional
vote. Multiplying ISS’s relatively greater influence with institutional investors
(the 10.7 percentage points) by the fraction of votes held on average by
institutional investors (60% of the votes) yields 6.4 % of the overall vote.
Note that this result is critically dependent on our foundational
assumptions. To the extent that the first assumption is incorrect, and some
individual investors follow the ISS recommendations (or some institutional
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investors are misclassified in our data as individuals), our result would
understate the magnitude of ISS’s power. We think this is unlikely because
ISS recommendations are rarely publicized in uncontested elections and
because individual investors are unlikely to automate their voting decisions.
Thus, they would only learn of an ISS recommendation through independent
research.
To the extent that the second assumption is incorrect and institutional
investors who follow ISS vote differently from individuals, our result would
overstate ISS’s power to the degree that institutional investors that follow ISS
pay more attention to the factors that affect an ISS recommendation than do
individual investors. It would also understate ISS’s power to the extent that
institutional investors that follow ISS would pay less attention to the factors
that affect an ISS recommendation than do individual investors.
There are two reasons to believe that the second assumption is at least
partially incorrect and that it biases our results towards overstating ISS’s
power. First, a significant portion of the votes attributed to individuals in our
methodology are actually brokers’ discretionary votes.135 According to one
estimate, an average of 19% of all votes cast are broker discretionary votes.136
Traditionally, brokers exercised their discretionary voting authority in
accordance with management recommendations, that is, for the board
nominees.137 Although a few brokers have adopted other voting measures and
either abstain from voting or vote uninstructed shares in the same proportion as
shares for which they have obtained voting instructions,138 generally broker
votes are more favorable to management than shares voted by their beneficial
owners.139 If one divides the shareholdings of individuals into broker votes—
which are automatically votes “for” each nominee—and remaining shares, the
135

See discussion of discretionary broker voting in director elections, supra text accompanying notes 29–

34.
136

See Allen, supra note 32.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1269
(2008) (“[B]rokers tend to vote in accordance with management recommendations . . . .”).
138 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 30 (discussing the shift in some brokers’ voting strategies). We
are not aware of any information to suggest that brokers vote the shares of their clients for which they received
no voting instructions in accordance with ISS recommendations. Charles Schwab policy dictates that it votes
securities held in its customers’ brokerage accounts, for which it has not received voting instructions, in
proportion to “all instructed shares held by Schwab.” N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 16 (2006) (describing Schwab’s
adoption of proportional voting in 2005).
139 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 138, at 13 (describing the anticipated effect on uncontested director
elections of eliminating broker discretionary voting).
137
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coefficient estimate for the interaction between the ISS recommendation and
the individual shareholdings not part of such broker votes would be higher than
the coefficient estimate in Table 6. Therefore, the estimate of the difference
between that coefficient and the coefficient for Insthold x VoteISS—the
measure of ISS’s power—would be lower.
Second, institutional investors who follow ISS have made an affirmative
choice to do so. While some institutions may have followed the ISS
recommendation as an easy way to satisfy their duty to cast an informed vote,
others may have done so because they are in overall philosophical agreement
with the way in which ISS makes voting recommendations. Even institutions
that for practical reasons want to follow the recommendations of some advisor
can choose which advisor to follow. Thus, it is likely that those institutions
that choose to follow ISS differ in their voting preferences from—and are
closer to the voting preference of ISS than—those shareholders who have
made no such choice.
Finally, to the extent that our third assumption is incorrect and ISS provides
additional information to its subscribers that individual investors do not have,
our estimate of ISS’s power would also include the following two components.
First, it would include the votes by clients for which ISS acts as a pure
information agent. Votes by these investors, as discussed in Part II, are not
based on the bottom-line ISS recommendation, but rather on the information
provided by ISS. Second, our estimate would include the votes by ISS clients
who base their votes on the ISS recommendation (but not on the information
provided by ISS), but who would have voted the same way ISS recommended
if they had known of the additional information provided by ISS.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyze the significance of voting recommendations issued
by proxy advisors. Our examination includes four advisory firms: ISS, Glass
Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance. We find, consistent with press
reports, that ISS is the most powerful proxy advisor. Of the others, only Glass
Lewis seems to have a meaningful impact on the shareholder voting.
We conduct several tests to quantify the impact of an ISS recommendation.
Although superficial analyses suggest that an ISS recommendation can have a
marginal impact of as much as 20%, and press reports state that ISS has the
power to shift 20% to 30% of the shareholder vote, we conclude that these
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numbers are substantially overstated. In particular, our findings reveal that
although an ISS recommendation has independent value, this value is greatly
reduced once we take into account the company- and firm-specific factors that
are important to investors. Depending on the test, we find that the impact of an
ISS recommendation ranges from 6% to 13% for the median company.
Overall, we consider it likely that an ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of
shareholder votes—a material percentage but far less than commonly attributed
to ISS.
Furthermore, we find evidence that ISS’s power is partially due to the fact
that ISS (to a greater extent than other advisors) bases its recommendations on
factors that shareholders consider important. This fact and competition among
proxy advisors place upper bounds on ISS’s power. Institutional Shareholder
Services cannot issue recommendations arbitrarily if it wants to retain its
market position. Doing so would lead institutional investors to seek the
services of other proxy advisory firms. Thus, ISS is not so much a Pied Piper
followed blindly by institutional investors as it is an information agent and
guide, helping investors to identify voting decisions that are consistent with
their existing preferences.
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Table 1
Panel A: Coverage and Withhold Rates
N

Coverage
Rate

Number of
Withhold
Recs.

Number
of “For”
Recs.

Withhold Rate

All
ISS
GL
EJ

16038
15823
15722
14147

1.00
0.99
0.98
0.88

1073
2956
1551

14750
12766
12596

0.068
0.188
0.110

PGI

5437

0.34

202

5235

0.037

Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Recommendations
VoteGL
VoteEJ
VotePGI
VoteISS
1
VoteISS
0.1683
1
VoteGL
0.1803
0.1425
1
VoteEJ
0.1057
0.0736
0.0548
1
VotePGI
VoteISS equals 1 if ISS gives a Withhold recommendation and 0 if ISS gives a
“for” recommendation. VoteGL, VoteEJ, and VotePGI are defined similarly.

Panel C: Recommendation and Percentage “For” Vote—Single Advisor
Percentage
of “For”
Votes
(mean)
Total
ISS
GL
EJ
PGI

Percentage of
“For” Votes
where Advisor
Rec. =
For (mean)

Percentage of
“For” Votes
where Advisor
Rec. = Withhold
(mean)

Marginal
Impact

96.44%
96.25%
95.75%
95.39%

76.14%
90.05%
91.02%
91.90%

20.3%
6.2%
4.73%
3.49%

95.12%
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Table 2
Variable
CEO
New Director
AuditMbr
Prior Restat
Prior SEC
CompMbr
Top5AbComp
Attendance
ManyBds
ManyBds x
CEO
Age75
NomMbr
Empl_Dir
OutDirLink
Interlock
Chairman_
Only
IP No
ClassBd
PPill
CumVote
GP
Top5AbRet
Bot5AbRet

=0
N

ForVote

=1
N

ForVote

% Difference

p-value

12566
13050
8389
13441
14210
8585
13870
13820
12107

95.0
94.9
95.0
95.2
95.2
95.5
95.2
95.2
95.2

1471
2232
5564
1841
1072
5368
707
93
1280

95.9
96.6
95.4
94.4
94.4
94.5
94.4
79.3
94.2

0.9
1.7
0.4
-0.8
-0.8
-1.0
-0.8
-15.9
-1.0

0.0000
0.0000
0.0009
0.0000
0.0008
0.0000
0.0033
0.0000
0.0000

13334

95.2

53

96.7

1.6

0.0977

13488
8460
13065
12489
13916

95.2
95.4
95.1
95.6
95.1

1794
5493
888
1464
37

94.9
94.7
94.7
90.7
92.7

-0.3
-0.7
-0.4
-4.9
-2.4

0.0967
0.0000
0.0495
0.0000
0.0366

13719

95.1

318

94.9

-0.2

0.5173

15136
9459
7242
13345
3700
14505
14536

95.2
95.3
95.4
95.1
94.9
95.1
95.2

146
5516
7733
1630
11275
755
724

82.8
94.8
94.9
95.1
95.2
95.0
93.3

-12.4
-0.5
-0.6
0.0
0.3
-0.1
-1.9

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.8105
0.0710
0.6463
0.0000
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Table 2.1
Interaction
Variable

Prior Restat x
AuditMbr
Prior SEC x
AuditMbr
Top5AbComp
x CompMbr
Top5AbRet x
CEO
Bot5AbRet x
CEO

=0

=1

N

ForVote

N

ForVote

%
Difference

p-value

13305

95.2

648

94.3

-0.8

0.0025

13607

95.1

346

94.4

-0.7

0.0490

13083

95.2

241

92.9

-2.3

0.0000

13947

95.1

85

95.6

0.5

0.5169

13963

95.1

69

94.5

-0.6

0.4434

The =1 group is where the variable in question is equal to 1 (For example, Prior
Restat x AuditMbr=1 means the director is a member of the audit committee, and
the company experienced a first public announcement of an accounting restatement
within the two years prior to the annual meeting.). The =0 group is where the
variable in question is equal to 0.
The p-value is from a two-sided t-test of the difference in the mean ForVote
between the =0 and =1 groups for each in the interaction variables.
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Table 3: “For” Vote Outcome
Variable

Model 1
No
Advisor
-0.714**
(-9.84)

Model 2
ISS

Model 3
GL

Model 4
EJ

Model 5
PGI

-0.648**
(-9.20)

-0.777**
(-10.73)

-0.709**
(-9.54)

-0.574**
(-5.93)

New Director

0.335**
(6.61)

0.278**
(5.61)

0.218**
(4.34)

0.295**
(5.91)

0.321**
(5.11)

AuditMbr

-0.251**
(-5.29)

-0.264**
(-5.70)

-0.193**
(-4.26)

-0.201**
(-4.40)

-0.126*
(-1.97)

Prior Restat

-0.0961
(-0.68)

-0.125
(-0.93)

-0.0722
(-0.53)

-0.137
(-0.94)

-0.226
(-1.46)

Prior SEC

-0.282**
(-2.83)

-0.260**
(-2.71)

-0.234*
(-2.57)

-0.287**
(-2.92)

0.0536
(0.36)

Prior Restat
x AuditMbr

-0.235*
(-2.06)

-0.192+
(-1.73)

-0.126
(-1.20)

-0.250*
(-2.25)

-0.119
(-0.99)

Prior SEC
x AuditMbr

-0.0959
(-1.08)

-0.0914
(-1.13)

-0.103
(-1.25)

-0.0788
(-0.92)

-0.381*
(-2.39)

CompMbr

-0.381**
(-8.24)

-0.334**
(-7.38)

-0.329**
(-7.35)

-0.354**
(-7.31)

-0.265**
(-4.40)

Top5AbComp

-0.105
(-0.66)

-0.0690
(-0.51)

-0.109
(-0.69)

-0.0733
(-0.46)

0.00164
(0.01)

Top5AbComp
x CompMbr

-0.462**
(-2.78)

-0.376**
(-3.10)

-0.310+
(-1.85)

-0.463**
(-2.79)

-0.493
(-1.52)

Attendance

-1.907**
(-10.64)

-1.188**
(-9.27)

-1.272**
(-8.33)

-1.512**
(-8.26)

-1.801**
(-8.84)

ManyBds

-0.394**
(-7.14)

-0.266**
(-5.47)

-0.298**
(-5.56)

-0.164**
(-2.77)

-0.287**
(-3.81)

0.264
(1.56)

0.0428
(0.26)

0.231
(1.36)

0.177
(1.09)

0.239
(1.03)

CEO

ManyBds x
CEO
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Age75

-0.351**
(-3.05)

-0.341**
(-3.02)

-0.306**
(-2.75)

-0.355**
(-2.89)

-0.199
(-1.01)

NomMbr

-0.168**
(-4.22)

-0.126**
(-3.29)

-0.108**
(-2.77)

-0.134**
(-3.24)

-0.113*
(-2.06)

Empl_Dir

-1.030**
(-11.04)

-0.848**
(-10.05)

-0.885**
(-9.89)

-0.957**
(-10.09)

-0.943**
(-7.30)

OutDirLink

-1.303**
(-18.24)

-0.967**
(-14.72)

-1.022**
(-14.96)

-1.156**
(-15.41)

-1.245**
(-10.82)

Tot_Dir_Shs

1.183**
(2.60)

1.424**
(2.95)

1.246**
(2.68)

1.172*
(2.50)

1.855*
(2.43)

Interlock

-0.110
(-0.61)

-0.306+
(-1.77)

0.334+
(1.92)

-0.127
(-0.78)

0.121
(0.42)

Chairman_
Only

0.0349
(0.31)

-0.0803
(-0.80)

-0.102
(-0.91)

-0.00752
(-0.06)

-0.0894
(-0.50)

IP No

-1.507**
(-5.10)

-0.631**
(-4.54)

-1.360**
(-5.14)

-1.381**
(-4.83)

-1.893**
(-9.00)

ClassBd

-0.263**
(-3.44)

-0.208**
(-2.89)

-0.252**
(-3.37)

-0.277**
(-3.53)

-0.146
(-1.32)

PPill

-0.0929
(-1.10)

-0.0770
(-0.97)

-0.0950
(-1.14)

-0.121
(-1.37)

-0.179
(-1.42)

CumVote

-0.0859
(-0.64)

-0.0157
(-0.12)

-0.100
(-0.76)

-0.0711
(-0.50)

0.113
(0.69)

GP

-0.0592
(-0.61)

-0.126
(-1.37)

-0.0638
(-0.67)

-0.0536
(-0.53)

-0.0110
(-0.07)

Top5AbRet

0.445*
(2.57)

0.414*
(2.44)

0.394*
(2.31)

0.385*
(2.25)

0.475*
(2.18)

Bot5AbRet

-0.484**
(-3.47)

-0.438**
(-3.22)

-0.391**
(-2.94)

-0.563**
(-3.15)

-0.677**
(-3.82)
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Top5AbRet x
CEO

-0.134
(-0.66)

-0.109
(-0.55)

-0.0603
(-0.30)

-0.0317
(-0.16)

-0.232
(-1.26)

Bot5AbRet x
CEO

0.310+
(1.92)

0.318*
(2.05)

0.177
(1.09)

0.212
(1.59)

0.119
(0.49)

Sdret

-31.62**
(-4.48)

-26.91**
(-3.91)

-28.99**
(-4.14)

-29.53**
(-3.82)

-17.93+
(-1.81)

ln(Market
Capitalization)

-0.126**
(-3.93)

-0.125**
(-4.17)

-0.132**
(-4.16)

-0.131**
(-3.69)

-0.119*
(-2.55)

InstHold

0.465
(1.42)

0.460
(1.48)

0.474
(1.46)

0.363
(1.04)

0.486
(1.05)

Year06

0.0197
(0.30)

0.00358
(0.06)

0.0420
(0.65)

0.00388
(0.06)

0.0910
(1.05)

VoteISS
VoteGL
VoteEJ

-2.216**
(-25.54)
-1.182**
(-21.52)
-0.595**
(-9.22)

VotePG
6.003**
5.946**
6.084**
6.078**
(11.80)
(12.34)
(11.96)
(10.84)
N
12644
12605
12563
11447
2
adj. R
0.109
0.185
0.163
0.119
t statistics in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Constant

-0.559**
(-3.22)
5.309**
(7.60)
4624
0.143
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Table 4: Marginal Impact of a Withhold Recommendation at Varying
Points on “For” Vote Distribution (Calculated Using a “For”
Recommendation)
“For” Vote
Distribution
5%

ISS
Withhold
0.2547

GL
Withhold
0.0859

EJ
Withhold
0.0403

PGI
Withhold
0.0437

10%

0.2171

0.0692

0.0312

0.0340

25%

0.1699

0.0505

0.0216

0.0221

50%

0.1310

0.0368

0.0154

0.0157

75%

0.1015

0.0273

0.0113

0.0117

90%

0.0780

0.0209

0.0085

0.0087

95%

0.0660

0.0180

0.0071

0.0074
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Table 5
Panel A: “For” Vote Outcome
Variable
CEO
New Director

Model
-0.709**
(-10.07)
0.173**
(3.51)

AuditMbr

-0.210**
(-4.72)

Prior Restat

-0.104
(-0.80)

Prior SEC

-0.229**
(-2.62)

Prior Restat x AuditMbr

-0.0837
(-0.83)

Prior SEC x AuditMbr

-0.0901
(-1.20)

CompMbr

-0.290**
(-6.62)

Top5AbComp

-0.0718
(-0.52)

Top5AbComp x CompMbr

-0.251*
(-2.04)

Attendance

-0.850**
(-6.98)

ManyBds

-0.190**
(-4.00)

ManyBds x CEO

0.0192
(0.12)

Age75

-0.296**
(-2.71)

NomMbr

-0.0838*
(-2.24)

915
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-0.724**
(-9.01)
-0.763**
(-11.93)

Tot_Dir_Shs

1.499**
(3.03)

Interlock

0.116
(0.68)

Chairman_Only

-0.188+
(-1.90)

IP No

-0.557**
(-4.11)

ClassBd

-0.200**
(-2.83)

PPill

-0.0809
(-1.03)

CumVote

-0.0394
(-0.31)

GP

-0.126
(-1.40)

Top5AbRet

0.369*
(2.21)

Bot5AbRet

-0.350**
(-2.74)

Top5AbRet x CEO

-0.0444
(-0.22)

Bot5AbRet x CEO

0.211
(1.35)

Sdret

-24.60**
(-3.61)

ln(Market Capitalization)

-0.131**
(-4.39)

InstHold

0.470
(1.51)

[Vol. 59
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0.0344
(0.54)

VoteISS

-2.473**
(-26.62)

VoteGL

-1.123**
(-21.94)

VoteISS x VoteGL

0.995**
(6.74)

6.024**
(12.51)
N
12524
adj. R2
0.230
+
*
t statistics in parentheses: p < 0.10, p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Constant
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Panel B: Expected and Marginal “For” Votes
ISS “For”
Rec.

ISS Withhold Rec.

Marginal Impact
of ISS Withhold
Rec.
-14.5%

98.4%
83.9%
Glass Lewis
“For” Rec.
95.3%
82.1%
-13.2%
Glass Lewis
Withhold Rec.
-3.1%
-1.8%
Marginal Impact
of Glass Lewis
Withhold Rec.
All expected and marginal “For” votes are calculated at the median of the log odds
for vote distribution.

Table 6: Institutional v. Non-Institutional Investor Model
Variable
Tot_Dir_Shs

Model
1.290**
(2.77)

InstHold

0.583+
(1.81)

InstHold x VoteISS

-3.137**
(-15.29)

IndivHold x VoteISS

-1.248**
(-4.52)

5.895**
(12.21)
N
12605
adj. R2
0.187
t statistics in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Unreported, the
models all include the same independent variables as in the base log-odds for vote
model (reported above as Model 1 of Table 3).
Constant

